can ultimately provide normative guidance for those who wish to implement lasting beneficial policy reforms.
Two factors will play a major role in the positive framework. The first concerns the role of interest groups that pressure the legislators and regulators to pursue policies that tend to promote their private interests rather than promote social welfare. Rival interest groups compete in the political marketplace for alternative regulatory policies. This can be considered the demand side for regulation. The second factor concerns the incentives associated with the regulatory structure itself. The incentives given to the regulators have powerful impact upon how policies are implemented and, often, which policies are chosen. This can be considered the supply side of regulation. In addition, the structure of the regulatory institutions also will have an important impact upon the incentives of different groups to organize and, in turn, which groups may be the most effective lobbyists. In other words, the relative strength of competing interest groups is not simply exogenous but can be affected by the institutional incentives.
Harnessing these forces to promote "good" policies is a key challenge for policymakers interested in lasting beneficial reform. In using the positive political-economy framework to understand how and why regulatory reform has come about in banking and finance, the paper will also have normative implications of how to achieve socially beneficial regulatory reform, in other words, the "incentive compatibility" of "incentive compatible" regulation. Joskow and Noll (1981) call this normative analysis as positive theory. 
II. Alternative Approaches to Regulatory Reform in Banking and Finance

A. Public Interest versus the Private Interest Theories
The traditional approach that economists took to explaining the existence of regulation emphasized that regulations exist to correct market failures and protect poorly informed consumers from harm. From this perspective, regulatory intervention occurs primarily to 1 maximize social welfare. This is why this approach is often called the "public interest theory" of regulation. The main challenge to the public interest view is that many forms of regulation have little or no redeeming social value. The geographic restrictions on bank expansion, portfolio restrictions that hinder diversification by financial institutions, and protecting banks from competition provide examples in financial services that are very difficult to rationalize on public interest grounds. Examples outside of financial services also are ubiquitous (see Stigler 1988) .
Virtually all regulation, regardless of whether it may have a public interest rationale, has significant distributional consequences. The parties affected by the regulation thus have an incentive to try to ensure that the government structures the regulation in such a way as to benefit them. Public interest rationales may be used to mask the private interests that the intervention serves. The economic theory of regulation, also called the private interest theory, characterizes the regulatory process as one of interest group competition in which compact, well-organized groups are able to use the coercive power of the state to capture rents for those groups at the expense of more dispersed groups (e.g., Stigler 1971 , Peltzman 1976 , and Becker 1983 .
Regulated group may be sufficiently powerful that they influence the regulatory There are many alternative theories of government and politics that have implications for the causes 2 of regulation and deregulation (see Noll 1989) . In particular, we will discuss the so-called Leviathan theory below. 4 bureaucracy to serve the interests of those subject to the regulation. In other words, the regulated group "captures" the regulators, hence this is sometimes called the "capture theory" of regulation.
The incentives for such regulatory behavior may be direct or indirect. Pressure may be exerted directly on politicians, though campaign contributions or votes, who then pressure the regulators to act sympathetically towards the interest group. Indirect incentives may come through regulators understanding that cooperative behavior may be rewarded with lucrative employment opportunities in the industry after leaving the government, a practice the Japanese euphemistically call amakudari or the "descent from heaven."
While the public and private interest theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive nor exhaustive , they do have different implications for regulatory reform. The private interest theory 2 leads us to look behind the public interest rationales to understand which groups are the winners and losers in the struggle for rents. This focus can then help us to understand why certain types of regulation are so difficult to change. A sound economic argument concerning social welfare thus is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about regulatory change. The emphasis is instead upon the costs and benefits of the regulation to different interest groups and the costs and benefits of the groups organizing and lobbying in the political process.
The effectiveness of the interest groups, hence the likelihood of regulatory reform, depends upon a number of factors. First, cohesive groups will find it easier to organize and overcome free-rider problems in lobbying for regulations that may benefit them. Producers of goods and services tend to be more compact and better organized than consumers, for example, so there is a tendency for regulation on net to benefit producers more than consumers (Stigler 1971) . The ability of a group to organize is often inversely related to its size, but many labor unions and trade organizations have been able to develop effective lobbying bodies through carefully crafted incentives that provide a variety of information and support services in return for membership (see Olson 1965) .
Second, groups tend to be more effective not only when the benefits are concentrated among group members but also when the costs of the regulation are relatively diffuse. The more concentrated are the costs of the regulation, the less effective will a group be in obtaining regulation to benefit itself. A compact group of losers each of whom would experience high losses associated with the regulation will be likely to form a lobby that will try to counteract the original interest group's pressure. Coalitions of different interest groups may then form.
Naturally, interest groups most directly affected by the regulation may join forces to lobby for or against a regulation. In addition, groups with completely unconnected interests may form "support trading" or "log rolling" coalitions. Two groups may agree to support each other even if the members of one group are not affected by the regulations that the other wants. Tariffs are a classic case of "log rolling" in which, say, lumber and glass producers support each other's call for higher protection, thereby providing greater support for higher tariffs than otherwise would be (Irwin and Kroszner 1996) .
Third, in addition to the diffusion of the costs across different groups, the level of the costs relative to the benefits obtained by the interest group play an important role (Becker 1983 ).
Deadweight loss is defined as precisely the difference between the winner's benefit minus the loser's cost from the change in output generated by the regulation. Factors affecting the Becker (1983) argues that competition among lobbying groups thus will lead to the most efficient 3 (lowest deadweight cost) regulations being chosen, so there is a tendency for regulation to be "efficient" in this sense. Wittman (1995) takes this argument further to conclude that both democratic institutions and outcomes are efficient.
When the constraint of future elections is less binding on politicians, they may engage in less rent-4 sharing and provide windfalls to targeted groups. McGuire and Olson (1996) , however, argue that less democratic regimes may be better able to insulate themselves from rent-seeking and might find it in their own interest to pursue economic policies the public interest.
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"efficiency" of the regulatory or transfer mechanism thus may have an important impact on political outcomes. As the deadweight loss of grows, for example, the losers are losing more for each peso of the winner's gain. When this gap widens, losers have a greater incentive to fight each peso of the winner's gain and the winners have less incentive to fight for each peso of the loser's loss. In other words, when deadweight losses are high, an interest group faces greater opposition on the margin to its protective regulation and hence is less likely to be successful. Similarly, politicians in electoral democracies are concerned about finding an optimal support coalition to promote their re-election chances, so they take into account the marginal costs and benefits to different groups. The rents generated by regulation in an electoral democracy thus are likely to be spread among different groups, even though one group may be the primary beneficiary (Peltzman 1976) . Government deposit insurance illustrate such rent-4 sharing. If the deposit insurance premia are not high enough to cover the risks, which is almost always the case, both bankers and depositors are receiving a subsidy. The distribution of that subsidy, however, will depend upon the structure of the insurance scheme. Flat rate deposit insurance, which again is typical, tends to subsidize the smaller and riskier banks at the expense of the larger, better diversified, and safer banks. Lobbying for flat rate deposit insurance historically has been consistent with this pattern of relative benefits (e.g., Calomiris and White 1994 and Hubbard et al. 1996) .
B. Political-Economy Factors Driving the Recent Trend toward International Financial Liberalization and Regulatory Reform
The framework outlined above suggests a number of factors to explore when trying to understand how financial reform can become politically feasible. In this framework, technological, legal, and/or economic shocks must occur in order to change the relative strengths of interest groups that would then alter the previous political-economy equilibrium. Identifying and analyzing these factors can provide a basis for facilitating and perhaps shaping future reforms.
Technological change is often cited as a key force behind the innovations in financial markets and institutions during the last two decades. In the political-economy framework, technological improvement does more than simply shift the production possibility frontier for an industry. Technical change can have significant distributional consequences, completely independent of its effects on the costs and efficiency of production, that is, such change is rarely "distributionally neutral." New products and markets bring forth new constituencies. Innovations affect the pre-existing markets and institutions and cause shifts in the interests and alliances.
Changing the relative strength of competing interests can then lead to regulatory reform.
One of the key factors behind globalization of financial markets certainly has been innovation in information processing and telecommunication but the change in regulatory barriers permitting the crossing of geographic and product lines also have been important. This trend has become even stronger as of late, particularly in Latin America, where an increasing number of foreign banks are purchasing local banks and entering these markets.
From the political-economy perspective, we must try to identify shocks to the old equilibrium that would lead to regulatory reform fostering globalization and liberalization (see Kroszner and Strahan 1997) . A number of shocks, for example, have increased the elasticity of the supply of depositors' funds, thereby eroding the value of regulation protecting local geographic monopolies. First, the invention of the automatic teller machine (ATM) in the early 1970s was one factor that began to reduce the value to the local banks of geographic protections.
ATM networks rapidly spread worldwide. Second, consumer-oriented money market mutual Since the increasing elasticity of deposits supplied to banks reduces the value of geographical restrictions to their traditional beneficiaries, we argue that these beneficiaries had less incentive to fight strenuously to maintain them. Also, as elasticities increase, there are fewer rents to share among competing groups so regulation becomes less likely (Peltzman 1989) . While any deregulation that eliminates inefficient regulation is broadly consistent with the public interest theory, the timing of the deregulation is difficult to explain by that approach. The opening of banking markets occurs precisely when the geographic restrictions are becoming less burdensome for the public, due to the elasticity-increasing innovations discussed above.
On the lending side, increasing sophistication of credit-scoring techniques, following innovations in information processing technology, financial theory, and the development of large credit data bases, has begun to change the relationship-character of bank lending towards less personal and more standardized evaluation. As a result of these innovations, for example, securitization of mortgages, loans, and consumer credits have become commonplace in the developed countries and are becoming increasingly so in emerging markets. In recent years even banks' lending to small businesses has become increasingly automated, relying less on the judgement of loan officers and more on standardized credit scoring programs.
Technological change thus has diminished the value of specialized local knowledge that long-established local bankers might have about the risks of borrowers in the community. Such changes have increased the feasibility and potential profitability for large and foreign banks to enter what had traditionally been the core of small, local bank activities. The large and foreign banks have therefore had an incentive to increase their lobbying pressure to attain the freedom to expand into these markets. In terms of our models above, the deadweight costs of preventing the large and foreign entry is increasing, so the small, local banks are less likely to be able to maintain the restrictions. In addition, as the value of a local banking relationship declined, local firms that were the main borrowers from the local banks also would be more likely to favor the entry of large and foreign banks into local markets (Kroszner and Strahan 1997) .
The method of opening up of the banking markets also is consistent with the private interest theory. Typically, new foreign entry is first permitted through investment in existing banks and mergers, rather than de novo entry (particularly of institutions that are in financial distress, as Citicorp's new entry into Mexico illustrates). By removing the geographic barriers in this way, the small, local banks have an opportunity to share in the benefits of deregulation by selling out at a premium rather than being competed out of existence. The smaller banks in the Noll (1989) has characterized conceiving of governments as distinct interest groups concerned 5 about financing their expenditures as the Leviathan Approach; see also Niskanen (1971) and Brennan and Buchanan (1977) . 10 country thus would tend to lobby for foreign entry through mergers because they would prefer to have more potential bidders in the market, which tends to increase the premium paid for small banks (Brickley and James 1987 ).
An increase in foreign bank penetration in emerging markets can generate a virtuous circle in that foreign banks tend to be less politically connected and less likely to be able to "capture" the regulatory authorities. In addition, they are less likely to succumb to pressure for directed lending by the government. With capture less likely and fewer direct benefits to the politicians of bank regulation (e.g., through quid pro quos for directed lending), regulatory reform becomes more likely. New Zealand, for example, began its reform process when roughly 30 percent of the banking system was already foreign owned. By the end of the reform process, a very large fraction of the banks had become foreign owned. This helps to increase the likelihood that the reforms are sustainable and not simply temporary. In sum, technological change was a shock to the old political-economy equilibrium and had important distributional consequences that are typically ignored in economists' emphasis on efficiency issues but are extremely important to a positive explanation of regulatory change.
C. Public Finance Motives behind Financial Reform and Globalization
In addition to the technological changes described above, financial liberalization has been fueled by a desire by governments to lower the costs of public finance. Consistent with our deadweight cost analysis, politicians would like to engage in their redistributive activities at low cost. Since the late 1970s, there has been dramatic growth in the use of publicly-traded debt as a 5 This form of financing could be seen as a mild form of financial repression (Fry 1997). 6 There is a long and rich history linking a government's financing desires and financial regulation. During the first fiscal revolution in the U.S. when state governments began to rely heavily on debt financing in the 1840s, for example, many states adopted "free banking" statutes. This legal change eased entry into banking but required the banks to hold state government securities as reserves, thereby boosting the demand for the state's bonds (see Kroszner 1997 and Strahan 1997) .
Emerging and transition countries that have recently reformed their government debt markets and 8 adopted auctions as the distribution method for government debt include: Bolivia, Burundi, Czech Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Slovak Republic, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia 11 financing tool for both emerging as well as developed countries (Kroszner forthcoming) . Before this time most countries, with the exception of the US, typically placed a large share of their debt with domestic banks, either directly or through a bank syndicate arrangement. While the banks 6 were to some extent captive financers of the government, they typically received compensation through protective regulation, below market discount loans from the central bank, and implicit lender-of-last-resort or deposit insurance subsidies. With government debt growing much more 7 rapidly than bank assets, however, it was no longer feasible for governments to rely so heavily upon direct funding by the banks.
Motivated by a desire to keep financing costs on their rapidly mounting debt relatively low, politicians thus had incentives to broaden their sources of funding. The worldwide reforms of the structure and operation of government securities markets during the last two decades, particularly in emerging markets, can be explained in terms of this motive. Auctions replaced or significantly supplemented the traditional placement of securities with the banks. Simultaneously, the government created or formalized a primary dealer system in which it authorizes specially designated dealers to have the exclusive right to bid directly in the auctions and to have the responsibility of distributing the securities to investors. 8 (see Bartolini and Cottarelli 1997 and Fry 1997) . Note that the U.S. is the exception in that it has long auctioned its government debt.
See Drazen (forthcoming) for a detailed political-economy explanation of why governments may 9 wish to sell their debt to foreigners.
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An important feature of these reforms was that foreign-controlled financial firms were permitted to enter the market and become primary dealers, thereby encouraging the globalization of the investor base. Previously, developing countries typically had shielded their domestic 9 banking and financial markets from foreign competition. The politicians had a strong incentive to broaden their investor base to finance their growing deficits, and the percent of government debt owned by foreigners has grown rapidly during the last two decades (see Kroszner forthcoming).
The internationalization of the government debt markets also has been associated with an increase in the liquidity of these markets. The primary dealers have an obligation to the government, as well as their own private incentive, to foster the growth of a liquid secondary market in government bonds. Liquid secondary markets help to reduce the government's financing costs, by fostering demand by investors (especially foreign investors) who are more willing to hold instruments which have easily observable market prices and can be easily traded.
Liquidity also facilitates the dealers' distribution of the securities to investors. The depth of the government securities markets typically has been associated with an increase in the depth and development of other securities in these countries and increased foreign involvement.
As the economic theory of regulatory reform would suggest, the changes which began the opening of domestic financial markets to foreign competition and created liquid debt markets, providing another form of competition to the banking sector, did not occur without some quid pro quo for the banking industry. In particular, the choice of auction technique illustrates a role for
In multiple-price auctions, winning bidders pay the price that they bid, so different winners may 10 pay different prices. Winners are determined by ordering bids by price and filling bids from highest to lowest price until the total quantity of securities auctioned has been sold. In a uniform-price auction, all of the successful bidders pay the same price. Who wins is determined the same way as in the multiple-price auction, but the price that the winners pay is highest unsuccessful bidder's price, not the price each winner bid (see U.S. Treasury et al. 1992 ).
private interests in the details of the institutional changes.
Governments consistently adopted sealed-bid, multiple-price auctions (also called "discriminatory" or "first-price" auctions) rather than uniform-price auctions (also called "nondiscriminatory" or "second-price" auctions). The popularity of the multiple-price auction 10 technique in the recent reforms contrasts sharply with the sustained academic criticism that this format has received relative to the uniform-price technique as a way to issue securities (e.g., Friedman 1960 and Smith 1966 , and more recently Rheinhart 1992, U.S. Treasury et al. 1992 , Umlauf 1993 , Tenorio 1993 , and Nyborg and Sundaresan 1996 . Unlike the uniform-price auction, the multiple-price auction is subject to the winner's curse. The probability of winning is positively related to the price that one bids in both types of auctions. In the multiple-price auction, unlike in the uniform-price auction, the expected profit from winning is negatively related to the bid price, given that there is some uncertainty as to the exact value of the securities in the secondary market. As a result, bidders will tend to bid a bit less at the auction than what they estimate the secondary market value will be. In addition, potential bidders without access to detailed information on which to base the estimates of the secondary market value would be less willing to participate directly in a multipleprice than a uniform-price auction. Consequently, the demand curve at auction using a multipleprice format will be below that in the uniform-price auction. The demand curve also is likely to be flatter, since the uncertainties generated by the "pay what you bid" format tend to make the bidders at the auction more price sensitive.
In principle, the revenue loss from the downward shift in demand at a multiple-price auction relative to a uniform-price auction could be offset by the ability to price-discriminate in the multiple-price auction. Actual and experimental evidence, however, generally indicates that the added revenue from price-discrimination is not sufficient to compensate for the lower and flatter demand curve (see, e.g., Smith 1966). In Mexico, for example, Umlauf (1993) showed that the government's auction revenue increased in their Treasury bill market when Mexico temporarily switched from multiple-price to uniform-price format. Tenorio (1993) found similar results for Zambia.
The sealed-bid, multiple-price technique also suffers from the potential for manipulation and may foster cartel-like behavior among dealers. The potential for precisely such manipulations was widely understood, having been described by Friedman (1960) 
decades earlier. When
Mexico briefly switched from a multiple-price to a uniform-price auction, for example, bidders' overall profits fell sharply and auction revenue rose, suggesting that the multiple-price format permitted greater scope for manipulation (Umlauf 1993) .
Given that the potential problems of the multiple-price auction were well-known, why have the reforms almost universally adopted this format? One explanation is that other countries were simply copying the U.S. which had used this format for many years. This solution, however, is unsatisfactory. Although the reforms followed the general pattern of moving in the direction of a US-style market, there are enough country-specific variation that adopting a different auction technique certainly would have been feasible. Rapid technological innovation, however, has begun to erode the information advantages 11 associated with being a primary dealer. Proliferation of inter-dealer broker screens and the growth of organized derivatives markets, for example, are narrowing the information gap between the primary dealers and others. As this trend continues, the value to the primary dealers of the multiple-price format may fall sufficiently that they would be indifferent between the two techniques. Eventually, governments then may switch over to uniform-price auctions and relax some of the distinctions between dealers and non-dealers that no longer provide important benefits to the primary dealers (see Kroszner forthcoming).
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An alternative explanation is that the multiple-price technique enhances the value of the information to which the primary dealers have privileged access. The reforms initially gave primary dealers or syndicate members exclusive access to the inter-dealer brokers, consultations with the Ministry of Finance, regular dealings with the central bank through open market operations. Most trading in the government securities also is concentrated in their hands. In a uniform-price auction, information gathered from such sources and activities is less valuable since both the informed and the uninformed bidders will pay the same "consensus" price. The primary dealers, ceteris paribus, thus would prefer to have the government use the multiple-price technique, and governments appear to have obliged. Also, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of this benefit for there is no line item in the government's budget to represent it. Obscure transfers are much more likely to avoid public scrutiny (as described in more detail at the end of the next section) and, hence, are a preferred means of compensation by the government. The reforms provided some benefits to the government, reducing their fiscal burden, and preserved some rents for the large financial institutions. Part of the trend toward globalization and 11 financial liberalization, thus, can be accounted for by public finance motives.
D. What is the Role of Banking and Financial Crises in Political-Economy of Regulatory
Reform?
Reforms are often associated with banking and economic crises, and the "crisis" hypothesis provides an alternative to our political-economy approach. Developing as well as developed countries experiencing major bank insolvencies have subsequently undertaken some reform and restructuring of their banking regulatory and supervisory systems (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996) . First on the list of sixteen hypotheses about reform drawn up by John Williamson (1994) , distilled from the experiences of top policy-makers presented at a conference on "The Political Economy of Policy Reform," is that "policy reforms emerge in response to crisis." Are crises an independent factor which can be said to "cause" reform to occur? Rodrik (1996) has been critical of the crisis hypothesis because it is almost nonfalsifiable --if reform does not occur, proponents of this view will say that the crisis was not sufficiently severe --and because reforms responding to similar crises take very different forms (e.g., Caprio and Klingebiel 1996) . The U.S., for example, responded to the banking and economic crisis of the early 1930s by fragmenting the financial system (Kroszner 1996) From a political-economy perspective, crises are associated with reform because crises are likely to upset the old political-economy equilibrium. There are four reasons for this. First, crises rarely affect all parties similarly and tend to have important distributional consequences. Since the relative position of competing interests is one of the key elements to a political-economy equilibrium, it is thus not surprising that reforms often occur following crises. Powerful groups or coalitions may fragment as their interests diverge during economic trouble, and new constituencies may be created. Although smaller, less diversified banks tended to support federal deposit insurance, for example, they became politically powerful enough to enact it only in 1933 (Hubbard et al. 1996 , but also see Calomiris and White 1994) .
Second, economic upheaval can change the relative costs and benefits of particular regulations. An interest rate ceiling, which may act like a price-fixing arrangement among banks to enhance their profits during normal times, for example, could lead to large outflows of funds and liquidity problems during high-interest crisis periods (see Barth 1991 and Strahan 1996) . Hyperinflation crises turn many of the regulations that had protected banks from competition into obstacles in the new circumstances. Innovations in financial technology may create new markets and institutions, and new constituencies with them.
Third, crisis can also affect bureaucratic incentives for regulatory change, as in the "Leviathan" theory described in the previous section. Deposit insurance, for example, commits the government to bail-out banks that have liquidity and solvency problems. During times of crisis, deposit insurance funds typically are bankrupt so an explicit taxpayer-financed bail-out would be necessary. To postpone such actions, politicians and regulators may have incentives to reduce various regulatory barriers as a quid pro quo for a financial institution using its private funds to bail out a troubled institution. Special dispensations to cross geographic or product lines have occurred in the U.S., particularly during the Savings & Loan crisis (Kroszner and Strahan 1996) , Mexico, where Citicorp recently took a large stake in a troubled local Mexican bank, dramatically easing the expansion of its operations in Mexico, and in Japan, where "arranged" mergers have helped some banks expand into new activities.
Finally, the enormous costs of a financial crisis may serve an important educational role for the public (see Kane 1996) . During normal times, individual voters may not know the full value of the implicit or explicit guarantees that the government, that is, the taxpayer, is making.
After a crisis, however, the government is likely to have to raise taxes and sell bonds in order to pay for the bail-out. This more explicit accounting will reveal the costs of policies that the public may not have known were so costly. Bank failures thus may heighten the public's awareness of the costs of regulation and may make it more difficult, that is, more costly in terms of votes, to maintain the old regulatory regime. The banks now would have to provide more support to politicians, for example, through greater campaign contributions, in order to offset the greater popular opposition. Since the banks are experiencing financial distress, they may not be in a strong position to provide the additional funds, so the likelihood of reform increases.
The reform and repeal of the Argentine deposit insurance system follows this pattern.
During the 1980s, Argentina experienced two major banking crises. The first in 1980-1982 has been estimated to have required more than 50 percent of GDP to resolve and the second crisis in 1989-90 roughly 13 percent of GDP to resolve (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996 and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 1996) . With such large costs to the bail-outs, the public was now acutely aware of the costs of government guarantees of deposits. Due to the hyperinflation, there were relatively few deposits left in the bank system to be insured by 1990, so there were fewer depositors demanding insurance. Also, the banks were in a rather weak position. In other words, the crisis involved a dramatic shift in the relative strength of the groups supporting and opposing deposit insurance. In these circumstances, it became politically feasible to eliminate deposit insurance and Argentina did so. This reform, however, was not completely sustained. Five years later, during the Tequila crisis, the interests in favor of deposit insurance grew and a private deposit insurance scheme was instituted (Guidotti 1996) . The deposit insurance premia are relatively high but the insurance agency is owned by the banks that contribute to it. Thus, if the system stays healthy, they earn the profits from the insurance agency but will bear the burdens when the banks require bail-outs.
The changes in geographic restrictions within the U.S. also can be understood within this framework. Kane (1996) argues that an important shock to the old equilibrium favoring branching restrictions was an increase in the public's understanding of the costliness of having government-insured but (geographically) undiversified financial institutions. During the 1980s, an increasing number of depository institution failures and the Savings and Loan crisis culminating in the taxpayer bail-out heightened the awareness by the public of the costs of restrictions that make depository institutions more fragile and more likely to require infusions of taxpayer funds. The result is the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act which phases out geographic restrictions on bank expansion within the U.S. (see Kroszner and Strahan 1997) .
E. Obstacles to Implementing Welfare Improving Reforms
Will policy reforms that can make everyone better off always be implemented? There are many policies for which there is consensus that they would enlarge the economic pie sufficiently that any losers could be more than compensated by the winners. Implementation of such policies, however, can be very slow or perhaps may not occur at all.
Neither irrationality nor myopia is required to understand why Pareto-improving bargains are not always reached in the political arena. Information problems and coordination problems Casella and Eichengreen (1994) extend the Alesina-Drazen model to show that the prospect of 12 external aid can increase the delay in policy reform as rival groups wait until the aid arrives before taking actions. 20 may lead to outcomes that are inefficient even for the politically powerful groups themselves (see Rodrik 1996) . First, opposing parties may become involved in a "war of attrition" which can significantly delay reform programs (Alesina and Drazen 1991) . Such a delay can arise when the opposing factions do not know what the cost is to their rivals of continuing the current (inefficient) policies. Rather than implement the mutually-beneficial policy reform immediately, each group waits to see whether one of the other groups is willing to "give in" first, thereby signalling that they are experiencing very high costs of the current policies. Having revealed their high cost of the old regime, these groups will then be in a weak bargaining position in the reform process and receive the fewest benefits or bear a disproportionate share of the reform burdens.
The high cost groups agree to reform only when they perceive that the net gain from reform, even though they will receive relatively few benefits, outweighs the value of waiting to see whether their rivals will give in.
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Second, another type of uncertainty could lead to a bias against reform and towards the status quo. Assume that voters and politicians agree that there exists a policy which will benefit a majority of the electorate. A rational electorate may reject such a reform proposal if the identity of the ex post winners cannot be determined ex ante (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991) . Without uncertainty, the reform clearly would pass. With incomplete information about which individuals will reap the rewards of a reform, however, the group of individuals who are uncertain about whether they will benefit may find it in their individual interests to vote against the proposal. This argument does not rely on any risk aversion by individuals, although risk aversion would make the Alternative models not relying on uncertainty include Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a and 1994b) 13 and Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi (1992) which develop dynamic games in which access to a "financial adaptation" technology can postpone reforms. Only one group, for example, may be able to adapt to domestic financial instability by moving its banking accounts and financial activities outside of the system (at a fixed cost). In these models, as conditions worsen domestically, the rival group without the ability to adapt will eventually agree to reforms, and receive a lower share of post-reform benefits, than they would have initially. 21 rejection more likely to occur. 13 Third, the potential for post-reform opportunism can undermine the ability to reach ex ante agreements. The compensation to minority of losers following a reform, for example, may not be credible. If a majority approves of a reform that would benefit itself, even including compensation to the losers, that reform would continue to have majority support without compensation. The minority understands this and would oppose the reform because they do not believe that the ex ante promised compensation will be forthcoming (Rodrik 1996) . In addition, compensation paid to ones' rivals today can be used by them to increase their political power in the future (Rajan and Zingales 1997) . Rather than compensation being a pure transfer, it may entail greater future rent-seeking, hence greater future costs to those paying the compensation than simply the nominal value of the transfer. Since interest groups cannot credibly commit to give up rent-seeking in the future, regulations that all parties agree are inefficient may not be altered.
III. Normative Lessons from a Positive Political-Economy Approach
The positive political-economy theory of interest group competition described above has been able to account for the liberalizing and globalizing tendency of banking and financial regulatory reform during the last two decades. Drawing normative lessons from a positive approach is always a difficult task, but the political-economy considerations suggest under what circumstances will make beneficial regulatory reform more likely to occur. Some tentative propositions about increasing the likelihood of welfare-improving reforms in banking and finance follow.
First, education of the public and of policy-makers of the actual and potential costs of regulation plays an important role. Rather than waiting for a crisis to reveal the full costs of poor policies, cost-benefit and comparative international studies provide a valuable role. When the costs of policies are obscure and little known, the beneficiaries of such policies will face less opposition in attempting to win political support for them. Uncertainty about the policyoutcomes of regulatory reform, as noted above, can slow the building of a winning coalition in favor of beneficial reforms.
Second, competition among rival interest groups can increase the likelihood of beneficial reform. Rival groups have an incentive to battle each other in addition to battling the consumer.
If they dissipate their efforts against each other, they are less likely to be able to support narrow special interest regulation. In many emerging markets today, e.g., Russia, a major question concerns whether creating universal banks would allow one particular interest to have too much political power and thwart reform. In addition, the rival groups have an incentive to try to unmask any misinformation that the competing side is generating. This can help to inform both the policy-makers and the public.
Third, the structure of regulatory and government institutions also plays a role. A clear structure of legislative oversight of the regulatory process through, for example, specific committees in the Parliament with responsibility for banking and financial matters may provide a forum which fosters the information generation process (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989 , McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989 , Krehbiel 1991 , Austin-Smith and Wright 1992 , Kroszner and Stratmann 1997 . Similarly, the incentives for groups to overcome free-rider problems and organize is related to the expected benefit of them doing so. In other words, the organization of interests is endogenously related to the structure of the regulatory process (see Irwin and Kroszner 1997) . Opening the regulatory process to include clear channels for new groups that would tend to oppose narrow special interest "capture" regulation increases the likelihood of regulatory reform by increasing the costs of maintain the regulation to the special interest.
Fourth, greater transparency in government involvement in the financial system is significant. Politicians often use the financial system, either through implicit guidance or explicit through state owned banks, to provide low-cost financing to targeted industries or groups.
Directed lending leads to implicit or explicit quid pro quos in order to have the banking sector follow this direction. Problems in Korean banks, for example, stem from encouragement by the government to continue lending to troubled enterprises in return for implicit assurances of a bailout. Privatization of state owned enterprises, for example, can reduce the benefit to politicians' of directing credit and can generate new constituencies for an efficient banking and financial sector (as long as the firm has been fully privatized and does not have special influence with the government). Requiring that any such transfers or subsidies be explicitly included in the government's fiscal accounts would clarify such transactions and help to break nexus of implicit agreements and quid pro quos through regulation that support them.
Finally, as noted above, a foreign bank entry can generate a virtuous circle because foreign banks tend to be less politically connected and less likely to be able to capture the regulatory authorities. Foreign banks also are less likely to succumb to pressure for directed lending by the government. With capture less likely and fewer direct benefits to the politicians of bank regulation (e.g., through quid pro quos for directed lending), regulatory reform becomes more likely. While there is no simple formula for successful and sustained banking and financial regulatory reform, a positive analysis of the political-economy of rent-seeking does suggest how process and institutions facilitate beneficial reform.
